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A number of recent assessments have confirmed the results of several earlier studies that 
Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) is a leading technology for human exploration of Mars. 
It is generally acknowledged that NTP provides the best prospects for the transportation of 
humans to Mars in the 2030’s. Its high Isp coupled with the high thrusts achievable, allow 
reasonable trip times, thereby alleviating concerns about space radiation and 
“claustrophobia” effects. NASA has embarked on the latest phase of the development of 
NTP systems, and is adopting an affordable approach in response to the pressure of the 
times. The affordable strategy is built on maximizing the use of the large NTP technology 
base developed in the 1950’s and 60’s. The fact that the NTP engines were actually 
demonstrated to work as planned, is a great risk reduction feature in its development. The 
strategy utilizes non-nuclear testing to the fullest extent possible, and uses focused nuclear 
tests for the essential qualification and certification tests. The perceived cost risk of 
conducting the ground tests is being addressed by considering novel testing approaches. This 
includes the use of boreholes to contain radioactive effluents, and use of fuel with very high 
retention capability for fission products. The use of prototype flight tests is being considered 
as final steps in the development prior to undertaking human flight missions. In addition to 
the technical issues, plans are being prepared to address the institutional and political issues 
that need to be considered in this major venture. While the development and deployment of 
NTP system is not expected to be cheap, the value of the system will be very high, and 
amortized over the many missions that it enables and enhances, the imputed costs will be 
very reasonable. Using the approach outlined, NASA and its partners, currently the DOE, 
and subsequently industry, have a good chance of creating a sustained development program 
leading to human missions to Mars within the next few decades. 
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CFEET  = CERMET Fuel Element Environment Tester 
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CTE  = Coefficient of Thermal Expansion 
DDT&E  = Design Development Test and Evaluation 
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EIS  = Environmental Impact Statements 
E-MAD  = Engine Maintenance and Disassembly Facility 
EPA  = Environmental Protection Agency 
ETF  = Engine Test Facility 
ESF  = Engine Support Facility 
ETS  = Engine Test Stand 
IMLEO  = Initial Mass in Low Earth Orbit 
INL  = Idaho National Laboratory 
INSRP  = Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel 
JANNAF  = Joint Army, Navy, NASA, and Air Force 
JPC  = Joint Propulsion Conference 
KDR  = Key Driving Requirements 
MSFC  = Marshall Space Flight Center 
NESHA  = National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants 
NEPA  = National Environment Policy Act 
NERVA  = Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application 
NF  = Nuclear Furnace 
NSP  = National Space Policy 
NTP  = Nuclear Thermal Propulsion 
NTREES  = Nuclear Thermal Rocket Element Environment Simulator 
PD/NSC-25 = Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum #25 
ROM  = Rough Order Magnitude 
RTG  = Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
SAFE  = Sub-surface Active Filtering of Exhaust 
SAR  = Safety Analysis Report 
SEI  = Space Exploration Initiative 
SER  = Safety Evaluation Report 
SNTP  = Space Nuclear Thermal Propulsion 
SSC  = Stennis Space Center 
TRL  = Technology Readiness Level 
ZPPR  = Zero Power Physics Reactor 
I. Introduction 
 Development of nuclear power for space use, and specifically of nuclear thermal propulsion (NTP) systems, will 
likely involve significant expenditures of funds and require major effort. The payoff of the development investments 
will occur with the greatly expanded mission capabilities that NTP systems will provide, and amortized over many 
future missions1. That being said, it is clear that the development effort still needs to be economically viable for it to 
survive the budget-cutters axe. Thus, affordability is a major consideration in the planning of the program. In his 
2011 AIAA/JPC paper2, Bhattacharyya had laid out the conceptual basis of an affordable NTP development 
program. Briefly, the approach begins with the utilization of the considerable database from the past, recognizing the 
technical feasibility of the concept has clearly been established, and build on that base. Based on the currently 
conceived and projected missions, a matrix of data needs for NTP “qualification” should be constructed. Most of the 
non-nuclear subsystems of a base NTP system have been developed and tested in earlier chemical propulsion 
programs (albeit without the same radiation environment as NTP). The Rover/NERVA and Cermet programs in the 
US and the extensive Soviet program developed a large volume of data on the nuclear subsystem. The elements of 
the matrix should be populated from evaluations of these earlier data, and the holes in the matrix identified. The 
development test program should be concentrated on filling these holes in the data matrix. Because of the schedule 
and cost issues with nuclear testing, use of non-nuclear tests should be maximized. Advances in fuel manufacturing 
techniques should be used to develop one of the two candidate fuels with maximum fission product retention 
capability, since release of fission products during operation has been at the root of many of the problems identified 
with NTP. Many of the individual design parameters can be verified by low-power nuclear critical experiments, and 
individual irradiations of fuels and materials. A limited set of issues can be identified that can be addressed by a 
well-designed integrated ground test program. Costs of ground tests (a major problem area identified in the past) can 
be minimized by developing a fuel with excellent fission product retention capability and selecting the smallest size 
engine for the mission. Prototype flights should be used as part of the development program. A bootstrapping 
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strategy of starting with a very conservative system, 
followed by progressive upgrades of capability 
should be adopted. 
 
In a basic sense, NTP is a thermal expansion 
nozzle engine concept similar to liquid chemical 
propulsion except the energy to heat the propellant 
comes from a fission reactor instead of combustion. 
With hydrogen as propellant, the specific impulse is 
about twice that of chemical propulsion since the 
average molecular weight is very low without an 
oxidizer.  The engine concept is shown in Fig. 1. A 
fission reactor is located in the thrust chamber and 
acts as a heat exchanger to heat the propellant to 
2500K-3000K. The hot propellant expands through a 
traditional de Laval nozzle. The feed system is very similar to the liquid engines and requires a turbopump.  
Surrounding the reactor are control drums containing neutron absorbers, used to control the reactor criticality and 
power level. Internal shielding inside the thrust chamber helps shield the outer components from radiation caused by 
the fission reactions. The major technical differences NTP has versus chemical propulsion include radiation released 
during operation, long start-up and shutdown, and lower thrust-to-weight due to the reactor and shielding mass. 
Figure 2 is an example of the radiation profiles for neutron flux and gamma rays during operation. The engine 
components and surrounding hardware (including instrumentation) must be able to survive the radiation 
environment. Figure 3 shows an example of the engine start-up and shut down phases. NTP start-up can take up to a 
few minutes, while shut-down depends on the length of burn and can take up to tens of hours before the energy 
released from the radioactive decay products gets down to tens of kilowatts. These added conditions of operation 
add complexity to the design and ground testing compared to traditional liquid rocket engines. In addition, the 




A. Lessons Learned from Past Programs 
While there have been numerous paper studies that have made compelling arguments about the advantages of 
NTP, there have really been only four major programs around the world that involved development and testing of 
hardware. The first, most widely documented was the Rover/NERVA program in the US conducted during the 
period 1955–1973, see Fig. 4. A smaller complementary program, featuring cermet fuels and a fast spectrum reactor 
 





Figure 1. Major Parts of NTP System. 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Radiation Profile for NERVA 
Flight Engine. 
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was conducted during the same period. In the USSR, a very 
significant nuclear rocket development program was undertaken, 
involving several Laboratories and the test site at Semipalatinsk. 
Finally, the Space Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (SNTP) program was 
a more limited, but still significant undertaking funded by the DOD, 
carried out in the late 1980’s to early 1990’s. The total represents 
many billion dollars of development work (in current dollars) and is 
a very significant base on which to build the current NTP program. 
 
The reports on the above programs have generally been 
exhaustive, and results of the test programs have been assessed 
extensively. The most significant lessons learned are summarized 
below. 
 
1. The technical feasibility of the NTP concept was established via 
all of the separate effects and integral testing.  This is a key point, 
since the NTP concept is complicated and involves advances in 
several technologies. All of the integral testing was done for the 
Rover/NERVA program, but the other programs added significantly 
to the database for the components, and in bolstering the confidence 
level in the determination of the viability of the concept. No show-
stoppers to the deployment of NTP technology were identified. 
 
2. The most challenging individual technology was the nuclear fuel, 
which had to operate at considerably higher temperatures than any other class of nuclear reactor, albeit for short 
periods of time. The extensive work performed in these programs established that there were several classes of fuels 
that had the potential to meet the demanding requirements. 
 
3. The very high propellant (reactor coolant) gas temperatures needed to maximize the performance of NTP 
engines has encouraged the use of special measures to enhance heat transfer to the propellant from the high 
temperature fuel. High engine thrust-to-weight ratios require high fuel power densities, and measures must be taken 
to keep thermal stresses acceptable. Thus, the Russians used a twisted ribbon geometry of the fuel, and the SNTP 
program went to small particulate fuel to maximize surface area for heat transfer. In the composite and cermet fuels, 
the heat transfer paths between the fuel and the coolant flow were kept as small as possible. Flow stability 
considerations argued against some of the special designs to enhance heat transfer surface area. 
 
4. The test programs spanned the range of parameter levels (power, temperature, operational time) that are of 
interest for applications of NTP. The implication is that there will be no technology extrapolations needed from what 
has been shown to work for the practical NTP systems deployed for missions. This is not true for most advanced 
technologies, for which extrapolations of an order of magnitude or more are typical. 
 
5. Not all of the problems identified during the programs were resolved by the time the programs ended. Principal 
among the remaining problems was the issue of integrity of the fuel forms during the test, and the release of fission 
products. The releases were not considered serious in the early days of nuclear testing, when most of the programs 
were operated, but would be unacceptable in terrestrial testing under current conditions. The releases could be an 
issue in human flights. The implications of this are that the containment of fission products during operation will be 
an important consideration in the choice of fuel type. 
 
6. The non-nuclear, balance-of system components (pumps, nozzles etc) are generally common to those used for 
chemical propulsion systems, and generally available from other development work. There is an additional 
requirement of radiation tolerance, but the neutron and photon fluences are expected to be small, given the planned 
operating history, and straightforward exposure tests should be able to provide the necessary data to certify their use. 
 
 
Figure 4. NERVA Test Engine XE' at 
Engine Test stand. 
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7. In addition to the testing intensive 
programs discussed earlier, there were a 
large number of studies conducted by 
NASA to examine the potential 
utilization of NTP systems. In all of the 
studies it was concluded that there were 
significant advantages to NTP systems 
that made them better to all of the 
competing systems for human transit to 
Mars. Figure 5 shows the most recent 
comparison. 
 
8. All of the past NTP programs were 
terminated prior to any flight tests 
primarily because of lack of missions. 
An accepted, compelling mission, with 
broad-based political support, is 
essential for the ultimate success of an 
NTP development project. NASA is now developing the infrastructure with SLS and MPCV which are needed for 
the compelling missions which can utilize NTP. 
 
9. A number of NTP development programs were terminated abruptly (which is atypical of many advanced 
technology programs). These abrupt stops followed by restarts after some elapsed time is a very wasteful method of 
technology development, because of the learning curves of the new participants, aging and unavailability of 
facilities, re-signing of contractors etc. One of the issues is that final reports on the work done in many of the 
programs were never prepared, adding to the overall wastage of effort, as much of the work had to be redone. 
 
Additional lessons learned from the recent development of the J-2X rocket engine are also very helpful. 
Development engines in a program are not flight fidelity and can be tested to extremes to gauge margins to failure. 
Start with low safety factors and evolve them to human rated ones later in the program. Involve Safety and Mission 
Assurance upfront, along with a dedicated risk management effort. The J-2X element requirements document is a 
good starting point for good design and construction standards. J-2X has two certification engines and five/six 
development engines to test. The recent development of the A3 Steam-Ejector Test Stand, to be used to test the J-
2X, will provide significant benefit in the areas of Civil Servant and Contractor experience base that will be directly 
applicable to the testing of a confined nuclear engine. 
 
For reference, it is noted that the cost of chemical rocket engine development is not small. Extensive effort goes 
into engine development and qualification to guarantee the reliability and assurance to acceptable levels. Human 
rating a flight engine involves greater effort and cost than engines used for cargo and science only. Table 1 shows a 
rough cost for various rocket engines flown in the past. The most recent human rated engine development is with the 
J-2X engine. The ROM cost is over a few billion dollars. Thus, the added cost for dealing with a nuclear engine’s 
operation and handling adds complexities and is unlikely to be cheaper than chemical engine development. 
However, what justifies the added cost is the huge savings for a human mission to Mars shown in Fig. 5. Saving 3-4 
heavy launches for each mission adds up very quickly. If future launch cost for heavy lift launch vehicles is about 
$500M5, then a 4 launch savings on a single mission pays for the majority of NTP development, not accounting for 
the schedule savings with fewer launches. In addition, as 
the number of launches decreases, the probability of 
leaving earth orbit increases4.  
 
The total cost for the Rover/NERVA program 
operating from 1955-1973 is $7.6B in FY13 dollars6. The 
total cost included AEC and NASA funds allocated. The 
cost included the evolution of different test cells, test 
stands, engine maintenance and disassembly hot cells, 
and a variety of engine sizes along with the manpower 
for all the engineering and operations. To minimize NTP 
 




Table 1. Cost of Past Chemical Rocket Engines. 
Engine Thrust (lbs) Period Development 
Cost FY12
F-1 1500K ‘59-’66 ~$3.0B
SSME 470K ‘72-’81 ~$4.1B
J-2 200K ‘60-’66 ~$2.6B
RL10A-3 15K ‘58-’63 ~$0.9B
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development cost, the current strategy is to focus on a small engine size (utilize a cluster of engines for the mission), 
the minimum required test facility, utilize existing hot cells for component inspection, and incorporate many past 
lessons into the development to take advantage of all the early effort and resources expended. 
II. Development Needs 
A. Concept of Operations 
A Concept of Operations must be developed that takes into account the resources used from Rover/NERVA 
Programs and collective resources of NASA and the Department of Energy and combines them in a cost effective 
manner.  
  
The Concept of Operations (Con-Ops) to be developed should start at the component level and move through 
flight operations.  It should take into account Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)7, contracts needed from the 
beginning to end of the program, construction of facility cost, manpower estimates and the flow of data, information 
and money at all external programmatic interfaces. While this sounds like a daunting undertaking, by using triage, 
adequate margins (both programmatic and technical), and by employing field experts who understand the 
relationship of the Key Driving Requirements (KDRs) to the choice of margin as it relates to the sensitivity and 
impact to the system performance, schedule and budget, a reasonably accurate and affordable set of plans can 
prepared.   
 
The Con-Ops should be developed by first determining the overall functional activities that have to take place to 
design, develop, test, and fly a nuclear rocket.  This can then be translated into KDRs for that activity. The possible 
solutions in the list can then be traded, one against the other.  How the different solution sets may be put together, 
and what level of risk is acceptable can then be compared through the lens of cost and schedule.  The best Con-Ops 
would then be the one with the best balance between programmatic and technical risk, schedule and budget.  
Political aspects of the winning Con-Ops must also be considered.  Sometimes the trade space is larger than what is 
defined in a study.  Many final decisions in NASA’s past have taken into account things like maintaining 
engineering skill and manpower for later planned activities, even when a cheaper or more technically pure solution 
was identified.   
 
One key to a good Con-Ops and cost estimation is the early and accurate identification of low TRL technologies. 
At every level of the engine, stage and supporting infrastructure a survey of the TRLs as they relate to use in a 
nuclear engine and vehicle should be made by experts in the given area.  Each technical specialty should identify 
areas where the current TRL is inadequate to proceed into the design phase.   By definition, the TRL can be no 
higher than 4 or 5 for any of the component on a nuclear stage.  TRL 5 is characterized by testing a prototype in a 
representative environment.  Certainly this was done, for some technologies, in the Rover/NERVA programs.  
However, it was done by a different team, the designs were different, and different tools were used. This means that 
much of the technology will be at TRL 3 or 4.  This does not mean that these are difficult to do, or that the program 
should not be undertaken.  Rather, it simply indicates that there is an element of risk that translates into difficulty in 
accurately estimating the operational needs, schedule and budget associated with bringing up the TRL.  Technical 
experts can provide input to systems engineers to determine the TRL.  This can then be used in existing cost models 
to determine the projected cost to bring the technology up to the required level.  TRLs are often overestimated 
because nested low TRLs are not considered, or impact at the contractual and manufacturing levels are not 
considered.  Overestimated TRLs will most often be manifested in budget overruns and schedule slips later in the 
program and may cause a poor choice of Con-Ops. 
   
Another key to developing a good Con-Ops is the accurate identification of requirements and what is required 
for validation of that set of requirements.  Validation activities, especially at the engine and stage level will drive 
infrastructure costs.  Validation at the component level can drive contract cost and often become critical items in the 
development schedules.  Development of facilities and the number of tests performed will directly correlate with the 
TRL levels of the system and its components.  The lower the TRL and the more challenging the design, the more 
Test-Fail-Fix Cycles will be required.  Often the development portion of the testing is underestimated.  
Methodologies have been developed, based on TRL, design complexity and team experience that estimate the 
amount of development testing that will be needed to fix unforeseen problems and validate the resulting engine and 
stage design.   
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B. Engine Requirements from Mission Analysis 
For Mars, mission level analysis has shown the need for engines that can produce from 25,000 lbf to 35,000 lbf 
thrust at 900 seconds of specific impulse.  Total burn durations of around 100 minutes during the mission will be 
accumulated over four firings.  The longest burn would be 45 minutes.  Keeping the thrust to these lower levels and 
flying clusters of engines can proportionally reduce test facility requirements on the exhaust side of the engine test 
facility.   This also can facilitate single engine out operations for some if not the entire mission, thereby enhancing 
system reliability. 
   
Determining the requirements for human rating a nuclear propulsion system could possibly be a challenge.  Past 
NASA human missions had abort or rescue options.  This will not likely be the case for Mars missions, or any other 
long distance or long duration mission.  It is possible that a larger numbers of tests will be needed to produce a 
design that engineers and managers have sufficient confidence in to proceed into Certification Testing and 
subsequently human flight.  The generation of statistical confidence at the prototype and specimens level may also 
be a way to establish confidence that mission success is reasonably assured.  Designing to minimize single point 
failures and include redundancy will be included in the engine and stage requirements set. (See NASA NPR8705.2B 
Human Rating Requirements for Space Systems) 
  
The precise approach to NTP engine qualification has not been determined yet. However, parallels from 
chemical rocket development can be used to lay out options. Unlike chemical engines, a nuclear engine cannot be 
green run before flight for acceptance testing.  A green run is usually a fully power level test of an engine prior to 
flight.  Solid rocket motors are not green run, their viability for flight relies on design margin and careful quality 
control.  It is likely that this type of an approach combined with zero or low-power critical testing may be used for a 
nuclear engine or combined engine and stage prior to flight. 
   
JANNAF guidelines recommend six engines as a minimum be developed to human rate a chemical rocket 
engine.  Four of those six engines would be development engines.  The development engines design would be very 
comparable to the other two certification engines.  Typically twice the operational life and numbers of starts would 
be demonstrated without failure or significant issue to qualify as human rated.  This will likely be a minimum 
standard for a nuclear engine.  Ultimately, for reasons outlined in the preceding paragraphs, more than two 
certification engines may be required to validate the design, manufacturing and quality control processes.   
C. Status of Database from Past Work 
Reports on the four major hardware-based programs listed earlier have been produced, and are available for 
review. As expected, there is an extensive set of reports from the Rover/NERVA program, with decreased amounts 
of information on the Cermet and SNTP programs, reflecting the smaller magnitude of effort expended in these 
programs. In the case of the Russian program, considerable volumes of data have been made available by the 
Russians in the post 1990 period of openness: however, the fidelity of the data has been questioned, and the lack of 
formality of the available reports has been an impediment to the use of the data. Data from each of these programs 
will be discussed below8: 
 
a) Rover/NERVA Program: The program designed a large number of reactors and built and tested twenty of 
them. Of these 17 were test reactors, one safety reactor and two ground test engines. The power levels of these 
reactors ranged from 44 MWt, to 4100 MWt, and the times of operation ranged from a few seconds to 109 minutes 
(of accumulated operating time). The large number of reactors built and tested provides a sharp contrast to the 
current practice of limited funding programs, and reflects a major difference in the public attitudes towards nuclear 
programs. The peak temperature attained in the composite fuel was 2750K, corresponding to a specific impulse of 
848s. While several of the graphite based fuels showed potential, the (UC,ZrC)C composite fuel was seen to be the 
most robust, and best suited to follow-on work. Considerable test data were presented for the fuel, including 
measured thermal/mechanical properties. At the end of the program, the one remaining unresolved issue was the 
leakage of fission products from the coated fuel. This has been attributed to the mid-band corrosion problem, caused 
by mismatch of CTE’s between the fuel and the coating. 
 
b) Cermet Program: The cermet fueled reactor program was run as a parallel alternative to the mainline 
NERVA program. It was designed to take advantage of the compatibility of tungsten and hydrogen and the 
possibility of attaining high temperatures with a tungsten matrix. In essence, the fuel consists of UO2 particles 
embedded in a tungsten matrix. The presence of the large amount of natural tungsten required the use of a fast 
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spectrum reactor, as opposed to the epithermal reactors that were a feature of the NERVA program. No reactors 
were built for this program, but cermet fuels (using UO2 and UN) were fabricated and tested in non-nuclear and 
nuclear environments. The fuel performed very well in non-nuclear tests with hot hydrogen at temperatures up to 
3000K with cycling. It also successfully withstood multiple nuclear transient tests at temperatures up to 2900K, and 
ramp rates of 16000K/s. In addition, the fuel performed well under steady state nuclear irradiation at temperatures of 
2000K, and burn up of 1.6 atom %. The fuel also promises significant safety advantages; first in its mechanical 
robustness, which reduces the risk of criticality on accidental compaction of the core, and second in its ability to 
provide inherent subcrticality under submersion accidents. The main shortcoming of the fuel is the lack of as 
extensive a database as the composite fuels. 
 
c) SNTP Program: The SNTP program featured a modified version of the TRISO particle fuels, with a UC2 
kernel, and various carbide coatings. The temperatures attainable with this fuel were limited to the 2400K-2800K 
range, and advanced bi-carbide fuels were identified as a growth option. Several non-nuclear and a few irradiation 
tests were performed. Fuel fabrication efforts with the UC2 kernels were successful, but the early tests showed flow 
instabilities that needed to be addressed. The program was terminated without major nuclear testing. 
 
d) Russian Program: The Russian (actually the USSR program) included a large variety of fuels and what has 
been reported as an extensive set of nuclear and non-nuclear tests in hot hydrogen. No NTP reactors were 
constructed, but special purpose reactors were designed and operated to test fuels and fuel assemblies under 
prototypic flow conditions. In addition, nuclear critical experiments were performed to confirm the validity of the 
core designs.  
 
For the (UC, ZrC, NbC) tri-carbide fuels, very impressive performance numbers were reported (3100K exhaust 
gas temperature, for a period of one hour). However, it was difficult to verify the results, and it seemed unlikely that 
stoichiometric stability could be maintained at those temperatures. The Russians claimed the use of a special binder, 
but the composition of the binder was not revealed. They also reported success with their version of cermet fuels, 
using carbonitride fuels. In view of the uncertainties, it was judged to be prudent to not use their experience directly, 
but add them to the large body of information that supported the viability of NTP systems. 
 
D. Key Development Items 
From the above discussions it is clear that while most of the components in the NTP system will have to be 
designed and sized for the application needed, there are two areas that will need long lead development effort. The 
first is the nuclear fuel, which is the central component of the nuclear reactor that drives the propulsion system. The 
second is the approach and facilities to be used for the integral ground testing of the propulsion system prior to 
flight.  
 
 The programs described earlier had developed and tested various kinds of nuclear fuel for the NTP application. 
While many of the fuels showed promise, most of them did not display the high temperature performance and or 
stability needed for NTP mission applications. In fact none of them emerged from the programs with an 
unblemished record, which leads to the need for a development program before final acceptance. The three which 
appeared to have the most potential were the (UC,ZrC)C composite fuel developed during the NERVA program, the 
W-UO2 cermet fuel developed during the parallel cermet program, and the bi-carbide fuel used by the Russians (and 
examined during the SNTP program). The Russians also worked on tri-carbide fuels in their quest for very high 
temperatures. The Russian fuels were not considered to be candidates for the current program because of questions 
regarding their claims. That left the two fuels UC,C composite and cermets as the two candidate fuels. The former 
had the advantage of an extensive data base, under prototypic operating conditions, but did suffer from significant 
fission product release problems at elevated temperatures – attributed to the mid-band corrosion problem, caused by 
a mismatch of CTE’s between the fuel and the necessary coatings. The latter had rather limited testing during the 
NERVA program, but showed great promise, and revealed no obvious show-stoppers. A number of reviews (e.g. 
Bhattacharyya, 2001) concluded that a prudent NTP development program would start with both the candidate fuels, 
and based on test results that address the performance criteria of the fuel, a down selection to a primary fuel could be 
made during the program. The luxury of having two potential fuel types that could be acceptable is a strong risk 
reduction feature of the program. 
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The issue with the integrated ground test is that the environmental constraints on ground testing currently in 
force are far stricter than those that were adopted during the Rover/NERVA program. Specifically, the fission 
product releases that were considered allowable in the early days will be unacceptable today. The implications of 
this are that if conventional test facilities are utilized, and if the fuel releases fission products as it did earlier, 
scrubbing and containment systems have to be added on to the facility design, potentially increasing cost. The 
alternatives are to use innovative integral testing methods, and/or develop robust fuels that can contain fission 
products. 
III. Programmatic Considerations 
A few major programmatic considerations must be acknowledged which can impact the NTP development 
schedule and cost. Some of these require a long lead time and must be considered early in the program.  
 
The National Space Policy (NSP) was recently updated under the Obama Administration in 2010. The NSP 
states “The NASA Administrator shall…By the mid-2030’s send humans to orbit Mars and return them safely to 
Earth”. This goal helps set a milestone on the NTP development schedule on when to have the engine certified for 
human missions. The NSP also has a section for Space Nuclear Power, which states the following: 
Approval by the President or his designee shall be required to launch and use United States Government spacecraft 
utilizing nuclear power systems either with a potential for criticality or above a minimum threshold of radioactivity, in 
accordance with the existing interagency review process. To inform this decision, the Secretary of Energy shall conduct a 
nuclear safety analysis for evaluation by an ad hoc Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel that will evaluate the risks 
associated with launch and in-space operations.9 
 
The nuclear safety launch approval process is composed of four requirements; Nuclear Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum #25(PD/NSC-25), radiological contingency 
planning, and risk communication10,11,12. Figure 6 summarizes the process for each requirement. The processes have 
been used in the past and most recently for launching radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) power system for 
spacecraft. RTG’s use decay heat from plutonium 238 and are radioactive at launch. A NTP engine uses a fission 
reactor and its radioactivity is extremely low at launch. However, similar launch approval process will be conducted 
for NTP to investigate impacts from a variety of probabilities from planned operation to possible accident and 
launch abort scenarios. 
 
The NEPA became law in 1969 and is made of environmental impact statements (EIS) which assess potential 
environmental impacts and alternatives associated with mission development, integration, test, and launch. A 
decision to proceed with investments is needed before full development. The decision maker is the Associate 
Administrator for the mission. A public notice of intent is released to the public to prepare for a draft EIS for the 
launch site and ground test facilities. Early public meetings are recommended for education and to start collecting 
and responding to feedback as part of the draft and final EIS. It is important the public stay informed to avoid mis-
conceptions. NEPA needs to start early before an authority to proceed (ATP) with NTP development. NEPA can be 
NASA Draft EIS Final EIS
NASA Record 
of Decision
DOE Safety Analysis Report












National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Presidential Directive/National Security Council Memorandum #25 (PD/NSC-25)
Risk Communication
Multi-Agency Radiological Contingency 
Planning
DOE – Department of Energy                      DOD – Department of Defense                                      EIS – Environmental Impact Statement      
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency     INSRP – Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel     OSTP – White House Office of Science and Technology Policy  
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done in stages. The duration can take 1-3 years and cost a few million dollars. Long term decommissioning and 
disposal issues are to be included. 
 
The PD/NSC-25 process assures the agency has an independent safety assessment to baseline the safety 
recommendation. The process involves multiple agencies because of multiple safety responsibilities. The DOE will 
provide a safety analysis report (SAR) based on the NASA provided SAR databook. An ad hoc interagency nuclear 
safety review panel (INSRP) evaluates the SAR and prepares a safety evaluation report (SER), which is reviewed by 
DOE, DOD, and EPA. The NASA administrator requests nuclear safety launch approval through the Director of the 
President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy and includes the SAR and SER. The process starts when the 
NTP development is beyond the critical design review. The process can take 3-5 years and depends on databook 
development. The cost can be in the tens of million dollars. 
 
The radiological contingency planning involves the federal coordinating agency representative ensuring a prompt 
response to an emergency, up to and including implementation of the radiological annex to the national response 
plan. The planning provides recommendations and protective action guidance for the workers and general public 
safety for all situations (e.g., handling, transporting, storing, disposal, launch abort and other possible emergencies). 
Basic safety guidelines for a mission utilizing radioactive materials are to provide protection to the public, 
environment, and users such that radiation risk from exposures are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). Risk 
communication is considered throught out the project’s evolution to ensure radiological risk is acceptable. 
 
Safeguards and security are another programmatic consideration. Highly enriched uranium (20% and greater 
concentrations of U235 and 5kg quantities or greater13) requires protection against theft. NTP engine designs of the 
past used large quantities of highly enriched uranium. Special security is required whenever significant quantities 
are on-site, transported for launch, or retrieving a reactor from launch abort. Added cost and schedule is not just 
from added security manpower, but modifications to existing or new facilities to account for Category 1 security. 
The current program strategy is to minimize the amount of highly enriched uranium used in the new NTP reactor 
designs and investigate effects on engine performance. The added complexities of Category 1 security can 
dramatically decrease if the NTP engine design utilizes the minimum quantities of highly enriched uranium with low 
strategic significance. The change is being investigated to determine the effect on reactor design and safety posture. 
 
These programmatic considerations are being accounted for in the NTP development plans since they greatly 
influence the engine design, ground testing, flight operations, program cost and schedule. 
 
IV. Fuels Development 
Based on earlier evaluations14,2 the decision was made to evaluate the two most promising fuels for NTP. The 
NASA/DOE team is working on cermet fuels (Fig. 7), and composite fuels (Fig. 8). Both the fuels have been shown 
to “work” in the earlier programs, and have the potential to meet requirements, so by carrying both fuels in the early 





Figure 7. UO2/W Cermet Fuel. 
 
 
Figure 8. NERVA Composite Fuel. 
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The performance criteria that will be imposed on the fuels are listed below. 
a) Fabrications with acceptable quality assurance and control 
b) Temperature stability (>2700K for 1000+ s) 
c) Mechanical/Structural strength 
d) Chemical compatibility (with contacted materials at high temperature in Hydrogen) 
e) Transient performance (multiple restarts) 
f) Comfortable margins to failure 
g) Fission product retention under operating conditions 
h) Easily adaptable to bimodal applications in the future 
i) Robustness for use in wider applications (e.g. high power steady state or nuclear electric propulsion systems). 
 
Current work on both fuels is in the recapture of the fabrication methods.  No significant showstoppers have 
been identified.  Meanwhile work is in progress getting the non-nuclear test facilities (nuclear thermal rocket 
element environmental simulator-NTREES and cermet fuel element environment tester-CFEET) ready for testing 
both kinds of fuel samples as soon as they are ready.  Thermal effects are significant for NTP, and in the interest of 
affordability, many of these effects can be tested in non-nuclear test facilities. The effects of a difference in 
power/temperature profiles in the test specimens can be accounted for analytically for initial evaluations. The tests 
planned include lifetime at peak temperature, compositional stability at temperature, chemical compatibility, 
transient stability, thermal cycling stability, etc. 
 
The non-nuclear fuel element test rig at MSFC called NTREES is being investigated to test simulated reactor 
fuel elements to close conditions of operation without the radiation environment. The site is licensed to handle 
natural and depleted uranium. The fuel element is heated with an induction heater inside a pressure vessel with a 
nitrogen ambient environment. Hydrogen propellant flows through the element like in the engine with the same flow 
rates and pressures. The facility was designed to handle up to 5 MW input power to test the material compatibility, 
thermodynamics, material properties and endurance of various fuel element designs. Fuel element designs which 
show acceptable test results from NTREES can next be tested in radiation environments to examine the effects. 
Figure 9 shows the diagram and photo of the system.  
 
 
Final testing of the fuel will need to be performed in a nuclear irradiation facility, which will incorporate all the 
effects (thermal and nuclear). The initial tests may feature small samples in contained hydrogen filled capsules to 
establish fission product retention capabilities, and thermal performance (to compare with NTREES results). The 
follow-on tests would involve the prime fuel selected, and use larger fuel cluster irradiations to establish interaction 
behavior. The tests would also determine fuel performance under operating conditions, as well as provide margins to 
failure. Facilities such as the ATR at INL (Fig. 10) may be used for initial nuclear testing, although they may not be 
able to achieve prototypic fuel power densities and operating environments. The availability of space in the limited 
test facilities in the US could be an issue in the overall schedule. Finally, nuclear critical tests would be conducted in 
critical facilities to confirm basic neutronic and nuclear safety parameters of the designed reactor core (Fig. 11). 
 
  









V. Ground Testing 
Ground testing of space nuclear systems presents significant cost and schedule challenges in general because of 
safety reviews, licensing issues, and the fact that it is generally impossible to reproduce the 0g, vacuum conditions 
of space. The situation for NTP systems is further exacerbated by the possibility of fission product releases from fuel 
during testing. Because of changed regulations, the experiences of the Rover/NERVA days cannot be reproduced. In 
addition, the declining support for terrestrial nuclear development in the US has led to the loss of many of the testing 
capabilities that existed in the past. This has called for a re-thinking of the ground testing strategy, and examination 





The National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP 40 CFR61.90), which states 
“Emissions of radionuclides to the ambient air from Department of Energy facilities shall not exceed those amounts 
that would cause any member of the public to receive in any year an effective dose equivalent of 10 mrem/yr”.  This 
means NTP exhaust filtering is required and is determined by the following: 
 General public location from the test stand 
 Wind speed and direction 
NUCLEAR & NON-
NUCLEAR SCREENING 
TESTS OF FUEL 
COMPOSITIONS
FUEL SUB-ELEMENT 
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Figure 12. NTP Test Topology. 
 
Figure 10. ATR Reactor Core. 
 
 
Figure 11. ZPPR Nuclear Critical 
Test Facility. 
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 Possible releases of radioactive particulates and noble gases before filtering 
 #engine tests per year and test durations 
 
The last ground test of the Rover/NERVA program was the nuclear furnace test (NF-1) done in 1972. The NF-1, 
with a 44 MW reactor, used an effluent cleanup system which successfully demonstrated how the engine exhaust 
can be filtered. Figure 13 shows a schematic of the system. Basically, the exhaust was cooled down with water, 




In 1993, the space nuclear thermal propulsion (SNTP) program had an EIS made for the consideration of two 
DOE locations. The exhaust scrubber concept considered is shown in Fig. 14. With national policy to reduce 
radioactive discharges to a level that is as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), 99.9% of particulates and 
condensed phase contaminates greater than .3 microns can be removed, and  99.5% of the noble gases (iodine, 
xenon, krypton) and vapor phase contaminates could be removed. The objectives of the scrubber are as follows: 
 
 Ensure that radioactive material entering the ETS remains in the subcritical geometry 
 
 Cool the test article effluent to temperatures acceptable for normal engineering materials used 
 
 Remove particulates and debris from the effluent stream 
 
 Remove halogens, noble gases, and vapor phase contaminates from the effluent stream 
 
 Flare hydrogen gas to the atmosphere 
 
 During test operations and accident conditions (including impacts of accumulated radiological material in 




It is clear that a scrubber system can be designed to control effluent releases from test facilities. However, the 
cost can be significant, so it is prudent to seek ways to reduce effluents at the source. The two ways being examined 
are: 
• Use of robust fuels with fission product retention capabilities 
• Use of the smallest sized engine consistent with mission needs for testing 
 
A. Functional Facility Capabilities and Operational Requirements 
The functional facility capabilities and operational requirements are based on what it takes to qualify and flight 
certify the NTP propulsion system, subsystems, and engine components. Table 2 is a summarized list of major 
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nuclear facilities, test objectives, and major facility requirements for a comprehensive NTP development program. 
The operational requirements are based on qualification and certification requirements previously discussed. The 




Other functional facilities needed include non-nuclear test stands for NTP fuels, components, subsystems, and 
full scale engine cold flow. Most of these types of facilities already exist and need modifications to meet the test 
requirements. The non-nuclear tests can help find the “non-radiation” problems in the engine design without having 
the added complexities and cost of dealing with radiation until it becomes necessary to perform focused nuclear 
tests. Simulated reactor heat can be provided by electric heaters (e.g., inductive heating) or chemical combustion to 
test the thermo-mechanical behavior of various components and subsystems. This should also help make the 
development plan more affordable with a shorter schedule.  
 
B. Candidate Ground Test Facility Solutions 
As previously mentioned, there were candidate facilities identified for most of the NTP development functions, 
which were once considered in past studies, but some have since been demolished. A candidate NTP facility 
database was put together as part of the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) in the early 1990’s.  A panel composed of 
NASA, DOE, and DOD members, with help from universities and industry, identified about 200 candidate facilities 
available at that time across the US19. The panel recommended having the reactor tests and full scale engine tests at 
the same location to share common infrastructure20. The panel also recommended on focusing first on the reactor 
and full scale engine test facility since they will have long lead times before being operational20. The NTP test 






Test Objectives Major Facility Requirements 
Engine Test 
Facility (ETF) 
Ground demonstrates full scale NTP 
engine performance operating close 
to flight requirements and off-normal 
operations required to verify, qualify, 
and flight certify the engine system. 
 
1. Part of the nuclear engine system development station utilizing 
support infrastructure and transport system. 
2. Utilize the facility hydrogen system and exhaust treatment system 
initially for PETR 
3. Capabilities required to flight certify the engine. 
4. Multiple test cells for redundancy. 
Engine Support 
Facility (ESF) 
Permit assembly, disassembly, 
maintenance and temporary storage 
of test articles and supporting 
subsystems. 
1. Part of the nuclear engine system development station utilizing 
support infrastructure and transport system. 
2. Remote manipulator capability to handle a full scale engine. 




Conduct fuel element development, 
verification, and qualification in a 
multi-element, prototypic nuclear 
system environment. 
 
1. Part of the nuclear engine system development station utilizing 
support infrastructure and transport system. 
2. Design hydrogen feed system and exhaust treatment system to 
expand to ETF. 
3. Capabilities allowing clusters of fuel elements to go critical. 
Hot Cell 
Facility 
Permit post-irradiation examination 
of fuel specimens and post-test 
evaluation of engine components to 
evaluate performance 
1. Part of the nuclear engine system development station utilizing 
support infrastructure and transport system. 
2. Proper instrumentation to characterize the full range of inspection 
measurements. 
Control Point Protected facility to remotely control 
and monitor the nuclear subsystem 
testing 
1. Part of the nuclear engine system development station utilizing 
support infrastructure. 
2. Contains all control consoles, data acquisition, and 
instrumentation/control systems to operate the station and test 
articles. 





Determine the effects of irradiation 
on materials considered for NTP 
1. Capable to simulate the wide range of radiation environments 
expected 
2. Capable for flowing hydrogen exposure of materials during tests. 
3. Adequate instrumentation to allow required material characterization. 




Facility at the launch site to support 
processing and integration of the 
NTP flight engine with the launch 
vehicle 
1. Category 1 security. 
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facility database was updated again in 2006 and re-evaluated in 201121. The candidate facilities include ones which 
meet the test requirements as is, with minor modifications or a completely new design. A few candidate facilities 
currently being investigated are discussed. 
 
One option to simplify the full scale NTP exhaust scrubber system is to use borehole ground soil to filter the 
hydrogen exhaust of radioactive particulates and noble gases. This is an extension of the strategy used for 
containment of underground nuclear weapons testing. The Sub-surface Active Filtering of Exhaust (SAFE) concept 
was proposed by Steve Howe in the late 1990’s and shown in Fig. 15. Borehole locations at the Nevada Test Site 
and Idaho National Laboratory are currently being investigated. Hydrogen buoyancy has been known to rise through 
soil from past experiences. The primary concern about the concept is the amount of permeability in the soil to avoid 
a significant rise in back pressure during a long steady state burn of NTP. Factors affecting permeability include 
changes with hole depth, water (used to cool the NTP exhaust) saturation, turbulent flow, and hole stagnation 
pressure are currently being investigated. A few other secondary concerns have been identified, but initial modeling 
results show promise. Subscale test reports from the NTS have been gathered and are being analyzed for useful data 
to compare with models. A subscale test setup has been investigated with an estimated cost to better help verify the 
performance of the SAFE concept. Figure 16 shows a possible test rig which can be used for the subscale tests.  
 
 
A new candidate facility being investigated which could help the NTP development is the new Advanced Post 
Irradiation Examination (APEX) facility at INL and is shown in Fig. 17. The facility is scheduled to be operational 
in 2018 and could be used to inspect radioactive NTP engine components after full scale engine tests. 
 
C. Trade Studies to Assess Ground Facility Candidates 
When all the candidate ground test facility options have been identified, a trade study will examine the pros and 
cons of each one to determine the best candidates. Figures of merit can be used to compare each candidate. The 
figures of merit account for effectiveness/performance, safety, security, regulatory, cost, schedule, and stakeholder 
acceptance. In addition, a risk assessment can be made for each candidate to meet its operational NTP requirement. 
 
VI. Other Development Needed 
The duty cycle, environment, and requirements for many of the 
subsystems for a nuclear engine are different enough from a 
chemical engine that much of the non-reactor components are in the 
TRL 3 to TRL 4 range.  Validation in a relative environment, in this 
case, one with radiation and representative duty cycles would be 
required to bring the TRL up to 5.  While this was done to a great 
extent during the Rover/NERVA programs, so much has changed 
for all aspects of modeling, design, manufacturing, testing and at 
the contractor involvement that the experience from the 
Rover/NERVA can’t be claimed as valid justification for declaring 
 
Figure 16. Hot hydrogen injection chamber built by 
Areojet Corporation and used by NASA for Lox 
augmented NTR testing. Possible Test rig for SAFE 










Figure 17. Artist Concept Advanced 
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technology to be at the TRL 5 or TRL 6 level.  The lower TRLs should be factored in during early planning for 
technology development and when estimating the cost for those activities.  This does not mean that these activities 
will be overly expensive, or difficult, merely that costs and difficulty will likely be underestimated and that failure to 
take these into account early in the program may show up as very costly delays, even jeopardizing engine readiness 
for critically timed missions.  Below is a discussion of some factors that need to be considered at the onset of a 
nuclear engine development program. 
A. Turbomachinery 
The duty cycle for most chemical engines is an order of magnitude less in time than for a nuclear engine.  That 
fact combined with the easy start and shutdown transients of a nuclear engine may call into question the use of 
typical rolling element bearings.  Foil or hydrodynamic bearings may be a good choice. Turbopumps on nuclear 
stages may be required to ingest saturated propellant.  Hydrogen, being a good neutron moderator, will be heated in 
the presence of the reactor. The propellant repressurazation system will add significant heat to the cryogenic 
hydrogen in a 45 minute engine firing.  As heat builds up in the propellant tanks, especially near the end of a longer 
engine operation, saturated conditions could develop. Ingesting saturated propellants can cause impeller cavitation 
and lead to impeller erosion, impeller imbalance and ultimately possible failure. The duty cycle for a nuclear engine 
also requires a long gradual shutdown to facilitate the cooling of the reactor.  This may also have a special set of 
design requirements for the turbopumps that need to be address. 
B. Valves 
There are a least two areas of concern with valves on a nuclear engine and stage.  The first is the leakage rate of 
propellant if hydrogen is used.  Hydrogen, being the smallest molecule, leaks past valve seals.  This is exacerbated 
by contaminates in the hydrogen, one of the most common is water.  Studies have shown that even extensive 
purging doesn’t remove all the moisture in a tank prior to use.  This effect is common everywhere in the process of 
separating, transporting, and transferring hydrogen.  Not all engine valves will be required to have a very low 
leakage rate, only the ones isolating the propellant during long periods of storage.  It may also be possible to 
combine leakage of valves with other Cryogenic Fluid Management (CFM) techniques or isolate them to minimize 
the impact of the leakage rates. 
The other area of possible concern is the possible lack of appropriate valve manufactures.  The companies that 
have typically supported development of rocket engines are slowly disappearing or changing their manufacturing 
clientele, and thus their core manufacturing processes, away from that which is supportive of rocket engine needs.  
The development of new business relationships may be necessary and may even have to be concurrent with the 
development of new low-leak technology. 
C. Nozzle Extensions 
The primary difficulty associated with nozzle extensions is the testing in a relevant environment.  It has been 
suggested that the extension be tested on a chemical engine, and that maybe a good plan for cost savings in the 
development of the nozzle extension.  But failure to test a fully integrated engine will violate the “test like you fly” 
philosophy.  Given larger area ratios of 100-200, the only way to test the nozzle integrated to the engine is the use of 
a steam-ejector stand.  The cost of scrubbing the exhaust from a steam-ejector stand will be cost prohibitive.  New 
evaluation criteria and possibly technology will be required to validate nozzle extensions. 
D. Avionics, Actuators and Power Generation 
The radioactive environment for the avionics, actuators and power generation needs to be considered.   This 
includes instrumentation and the requirements of instrumentation and avionics.  Classic open or closed loop control 
may prove to be problematic.  Even though reactor manufactures and their supporting infrastructure are used to 
dealing with the problems associated with operating in a reactor environment, rocket engine companies and their 
support network are not.  Early planning and consideration of technology needs will pay off in lower overall 
development cost and fewer schedule delays.   
 
E. Analysis Tools 
The suite of analysis tools required to integrate a rector into a rocket engine does not exist in an integrated and 
validated form or process.  Some parts of the analytical toolbox exist and have successfully been applied to 
empirical data; however, the broad set of analytical tools needed to successfully integrate a reactor into a rocket 
engine does not exist.  The problem is amplified if a prime contractor is used to develop the nuclear rocket engine 
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since the prime will likely not be brought on board until after the Government Systems Requirements Review 
(SRR).  Consideration should be given to bringing the prime on early or developing several primes analytical 
capabilities very early in the life of the Project/Program. These capabilities should include Neutronics, engine 
thermodynamic balance, reactor flow distribution, comprehensive reactor temperature prediction, flow induced 
vibration, thermal expansion, stress, strain, material deformation, material degradation and others as identified.  This 
analysis may be done in a multi-physics tool, but such a tool would need to be integrated into a complete design 
process. 
 
F. Cryogenic Fluid Management 
CFM is another technology needing development in parallel to NTP for NTP to be utilized. Hydrogen has 
always been the best propellant option for NTP because it provides the best Isp. Figure 18 shows the comparison of 
Isp to a variety of other propellant options. Other propellant options may have better storability, density, etc...  
However, lower Isp can lead to a greater # of launch vehicles to deliver a greater IMLEO. The technical challenges 
involving the use of hydrogen includes being able to store the propellant with minimum boil-off for a few years and 





All of these technologies need to be worked over the next couple of years to mature the technologies to TRL 5 
level. It will be hard to justify an authority to proceed with full scale NTP development if too many critical 
technologies are not mature enough. 
VII. Possible Prototype Flight Test 
Based on previous discussions, it is impossible to have a complete flight like test capability on the ground. 
Therefore, a prototype flight test could demonstrate full nozzle expansion and radiate heat to space, perform thrust 
vector control with the engine operating, validate reactor operation without effects from facility surroundings, more 
accurately examine radiation effects on the stage throughout the mission, and exposure to space environment effects. 
The flight reaches earth escape velocity and can consist of multiple burns with different burn durations. Engine 
cooldown can also be examined. Ideally, the prototype flight test could perform double duty by undertaking a 
planned unmanned mission (e.g., asteroid reconnaissance). 
 
 
Figure 18. NTP Performance Comparison of Various Propellants. 
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A problem with flight tests is the difficulty with post-test examination of components to feedback on future 
engine designs. Options under consideration to address this include extra instrumentation to collect information, and 
the use of modern robotics to inspect the engine and stage at the end of the mission. After waiting for the radiation 
level to significantly drop, a “robonaut” could start taking the engine apart and examine components. The added 
flight inspection would provide additional data to help build higher confidence for human missions.  
 
Lessons learned from the ARES 1-X flight demo could help the strategy for a NTP prototype. The ARES 1-X 
test flight project was completed in three years. Man ratings and added factors of safety and redundancy not needed 
for the test flight. Thus, a prototype flight test early in the development program may find significant redesigns 
needed for basic NTP operation and allow time for upgraded development engines to ground test the modifications 
before the next flight test. 
VIII. Development Schedule and Cost Logic Flow 
The paper has discussed many factors which influence the NTP development cost and schedule. Figure 19 shows 
a simplified logic flow on the approach to determine the final development plan and cost. There are two parallel 
paths that need to be worked with cross talk between them. One path involves the selection of the best test facilities, 
while the other path involves the engine DDT&E. Other considerations (e.g., political, environmental, and 
economic) must also be included. Both paths converge to the final plan and total development cost. Work has started 
on each block identifying objectives, tasks needing to be performed, and collection of useful data. The goal is to 
achieve a rough order estimate of the development plan and cost by the end of FY14. 
 
 
IX. Summary  
The paper provided an overview of the affordable development and qualification strategy and discussed the 
following major sections: 
• Major lessons learned and database from past NTP and chemical propulsion programs 
• Important development needs for the NTP stage, engine system, subsystem (includes reactor and fuels), 
and components 
• Ground testing challenges and limitations 
• Other programmatic considerations 
• Potential prototype flight test 
• Development plan logic flow 
 
A full paper could be written on each of these sections. However, enough information was provided to show the 
scope of complexity which is being implemented in the plans. Many people have been skeptical on the cost and 
schedule for NTP development and think it will cost too much and take too long for DDT&E. The current plan is to 
take into account everything that needs to be done for NTP qualification, acceptance, and utilization with respect to 
cost and schedule to build a complete and confidant development plan. Accounting for all the factors which 
influence the development plan and quantify the factors based on experience, analysis, analogies or similarities, will 
build greater justification with less uncertainty to have an authority to proceed with NTP development. The 
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Figure 19. NTP Development Plan Logic Flow. 
 
 
Figure 20. Conceptual Approach. 
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philosophy we are using is to keep the development plan as simple as possible with only “must haves” and not “nice 
to haves”. Figure 20 summarizes the conceptual approach for an affordable NTP development strategy. 
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